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The Corpus: A Tool among Others
Tobias Scheer
 
1. Things that ought to be trivial
1 The general idea exposed in the pages below ought to be quite trivial, but may be less so
in the current landscape: the corpus was, is and will be a valuable tool that helps pursuing
a  goal.  Its  ontological  status  as  a  tool  will  not  change,  no  matter  how fabulous  the
computational power, storage capacity, access and transmission speed, and whatever the
size of the corpus. Like all other scientists, linguists have been, are and will be keen to
base their reasoning on the best data possible, i.e. data which are reliable, significant,
exhaustive, fine-grained etc. The corpus is a data source among others, which has specific
properties, i.e. advantages and limitations. The user needs to be aware of these when
dealing  with  corpora.  This  again  is  quite  trivial  a  statement,  since  everybody  who
inquires into something should be aware of the properties, limitations, and eventual bias-
introducing shortcomings of the instrument used. The same is of course true for other
sources of evidence such as grammaticality judgements. 
2 A related but distinct issue is the fact that "the corpus" is not a monolithic thing: there
are many different ways of building corpora, and there are many different ways in which
corpora may be used.  The result  of  corpus-based studies  is  a  function of  the design
properties of the corpus, and of the way the corpus is used. But again, this is all just
regular common sense: bad data make hardly a good theory, and bad usage of good data
does not either. The corpus is not good or bad per se, it can provide some kind of evidence
but is unable to produce other relevant information. 
3 As in all  other scientific  inquiry,  and especially in the adult  (or  successful)  sciences,
advances  in  understanding  how  language  works  are  based  on  the  dialectic  tension
between observation and expectation/theory. It is trivially true that data may and should
falsify theories, and hence that better data, i.e. data which are more exhaustive, more
fine-grained,  more  representative  etc.,  are  better  referees.  This  is  where  the
technological  progress  produced by searchable electronic  corpora is  useful.  It  is  also
trivially true,  however,  that "le point de vue crée l'objet" (Saussure:  the point  of  view
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creates the object). That is, one may stare at a pattern for ages without understanding in
which way it makes sense because one is not looking at it through the right lens. 
4 The conclusion, then, is very simple and again trivial: like all other areas of scientific
inquiry, linguistics needs to be fed with reliable, significant, representative and if possible
exhaustive data. Like all other scientists, the linguist builds generalizations and theories
on all  data  available,  whatever  their  source  as  long  as  it  is  valid.  Going  along with
Feyerabend (1976), any source of evidence is a possible source, and argument will decide
whether it should be used or not. Astrological evidence is a possible candidate for input
data to linguistic reasoning, but it won't pass the filter of argumentation. As far as I can
see,  there  is  no  conclusive  argument  that  discards  the  corpus  or  grammaticality
judgements as such. Hence both can and should be used (as much as other sources of
evidence) – but when they are, users should be aware of their properties and limitations.
 
2. The corpus and real-world issues
2.1. When the system goes mad: corpora in the midst of
"employability" and "societal demand"
5 Corpora also have a number of very real-world properties these days,  since they are
relevant in funding competition and decision, as well as for careers and the structuring of
scholarly institutions. Drowned in the ambient utilitarianism and project-hysteria, many
people believe, overtly or tacitly (or without being aware that they do), that research (and
especially a "project") which involves the building of a corpus coupled with exploitation
by a "powerful" computer programme (or even better: surpuissant in French), is more
serious than a competitor which does not. Some even believe that the whole purpose of a
research project may be the creation of a corpus, and that the corpus (together with the
computational power of the search engine) will produce science by itself, i.e. substitute
itself to reasoning and the data-expectation dialectic. Project-based science must produce
"deliverables",  i.e.  real-world  objects  that  one  can touch and put  on  a  website,  like
corpora. Merely advancing understanding and publishing it in peer-reviewed journals is
of course not a sound "deliverable". Finally, the same ideology promotes the idea that
whatever scientific statement is made, it needs to be statistically relevant: statistics are
the ultimate proof in science (ask Einstein…). This is where the corpus stops being a tool,
i.e. where the system goes mad. And it did on a large scale in the past decade or so. Poor
corpora  are  in  the  middle  of  this  thunderstorm,  and are  abundantly  abused  by  the
ideology in place.
6 At least for about a decade, we have lived through a period of intellectual decline where
technology and data are confused with science. Rather than stemming from scientists
(who however accommodate themselves in the new market-driven environment without
too much mourning),  this confusion is deliberate,  organized and imposed by political
decision makers. These do not belong to individual countries, but to larger entities like
the European Community and its tentacular sub-organizations, or the so-called Bologna
Process (dating back to 1999, currently 47 countries adhering). A common feature of all
these  is  that  the  acting  individuals  are  elected  by  nobody:  they  are  anonymous
technocrats whose proposals are never discussed in public before they are applied by
individual governments or groupings thereof. An example is the OECD (Organization for
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development),  whose  slogan is  "better  politics  for  better
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lives", which has played an important role in what Nicolas Sarkozy called the "piloting of
science",  i.e.  the idea that  higher education and research are only legitimate if  they
respond either to demands of the market or of society. Byzantology is worth nothing
because it does not augment the "employability" of students, and it does not help urban
mobility, curing Alzheimer disease or making smartphone apps.1 
7 The  transformation  of  universities  into  simple  institutions  that  produce  the  human
material needed by "the market" in order to run capitalism is in full swing. The original
idea  (dating  back  to  Antiquity  and  the  Renaissance  when modern  Universities  were
founded) that (higher) education is a necessary ingredient in the development of humans
and indispensable in a democratic society where citizens need to make up their mind
about general issues when they vote – all this is silently and tacitly trashed. The only
relevant issue today is the employability of students, and whether research can be used
by industry or satisfies a "societal demand" (French newspeak: demande sociétale). 
8 The result is fake research: scientists apply for project money pretending that they are
interested in one thing when they are interested in another, and then try to spend money
and time on the latter as much as they can. Since they still need to pretend that they
worked for what they announced, they spend their official work time on what they do not
want to do, and do the real research – the one that is motivated by curiosity and the wish
to understand how nature works – at night and in their free time. This was exactly the
situation of science in the Middle Ages before the State made it a public affair: either
scientists had a personal fortune (e.g. Descartes), or they were covered by Church, or they
had a day-time job such as librarian, secretary, teacher of children from noble families,
accountant etc., and did their science in their free time (Kepler, Copernicus).
9 People who drive scientists to do fake research know very well that in the history of
science, typically a discovery was completely useless for industry, "the market" or society
by the time it was made. It is only long after the death of the discoverer, sometimes
centuries later, that the knowledge is condensed into something that can be sold on the
market or does good to society (GPS based on Einstein's theory of relativity is an oft-
quoted example). But the decision makers in question put a lot of energy into ignoring
this fact, short-lived as they are with a two- or three-year horizon before they need to be
reelected,  staring at the monthly unemployment statistics and living at the capitalist
rhythm of short-term profit. It is the same people who have happily contracted public
debts  over  decades,  knowing  very  well  that  they  cannot  be  paid  back  by  future
generations, but without being bothered by this fact because they will be out of office,
retired or dead when the system eventually crashes.
 
2.2. Instruments serve a purpose and are theory-dependent
10 The corpus stands in the midst of all this, and its status in research is impacted by the
ideology described. That is, corpora and the computational instruments associated follow
the law of  all  cutting-edge technology:  there is  hype and enthusiasm around its  sole
technological properties, and there is the naïve, Titanic-based positivist belief that high-
tech will produce results by its own. We all know, and history (of science) has shown, that
it does not. Advances are made when technology serves a purpose, a hypothesis or a goal:
there is no science outside the realm defined by the observation-expectation dialectic. 
11 For instance, physicists may put a lot of energy, money, devotion and sophistication into
constructing the tools that they need, for example a particle accelerator. They never lose
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sight  of  the  fact,  though,  that  having built  the  CERN machine for  example  serves  a
purpose and is only one step on a way that may well lead nowhere. In order to know, they
need to put their tool to use, and in order to do so, they need to design an experiment
that complies with the technical properties of the machine and promises a result: they
need a hypothesis,  and a theory.  And they need to know what they are looking for.
Browsing data when you do not know what you are looking for is putting yourself in the
aforementioned  situation  where  somebody  may  stare  at  a  pattern  for  ages  without
recognizing its contours.2
12 In other words, machines, and more generally instruments, are always designed for a
specific  purpose  and  with  specific  expectations:  people  want  to  prove  or  disprove
something, or they want to understand how something works. That is, an intrinsic design
property of corpora is the goal that is expected to be achieved with their help. Therefore
the instrument is never neutral, and will never produce "raw" data. The myth of the
existence of objective, uninterpreted or raw data is typically used in order to discredit a
group  of  people  from  different  theoretical  or  philosophical  quarters,  or  who  use  a
different  methodology  (e.g.  corpus  vs.  elicitation,  phonetics  vs.  phonology  etc.).  The
difference between distinct instruments, though, is not that one produces objective, exact
and reliable data, while the other is biased – it is only the fact that the bias (i.e. what
exactly lies between the observer and the real world) of one party is made explicit, while
the one of the other is denied and tried to be kept hidden under the rug. 
13 That there is no such thing as a one-to-one blueprint of reality is not only due to the
instrument  that  links  the real  world to  the observer.  It  is  also  a  fact  established in
philosophy at least since Kant:  humans can observe the real world (thing-in-itself,  or
noumenon) only through the perception of  one of  their  five senses (and this  is  true
whatever sophisticated aiding machines will be plugged in). The five senses thus stand in
the way of a direct perception, and we know for sure that they are not reliable: many
established facts such as categorical perception, the McGurk effect or dichotic perception
show that  the human percept  may be dramatically  distinct  from the signal  that  has
reached his senses. That is, the reality that humans talk about is never the real world
itself,  but  properties  thereof  reworked  and  augmented  by  some  mechanism  of  our
cognitive and perceptual apparatus, whose workings we do not understand today.
14 Current quantum physics is entirely based on this:  the fact of observing modifies the
object  observed,  to  the  effect  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  observational  fact
independent of the observation, and hence of the observer. Another way of putting this
confirmation of the Kantian insight is this: "quantum mechanics requires interpretation
before it describes the experience of an observer. […] [T]he behavior of a system after
observation is completely different than the usual behavior" (Wikipedia).
15 There is no reason, though, to believe that man will be unable to make advances in the
understanding of himself or the world around him. Scientific understanding has always
been made by people who were drowned in systems of belief, typically of a religious kind,
and therefore had strong expectations and preconceptions. Reason and fact always ended
up prevailing,  even if  it  is  true that institutional  and belief-related brakes may have
slowed  down  the  emergence  of  understanding.  Hence  there  is  nothing  wrong  with
investigators being engaged in systems of belief, which may strongly structure the way
they  proceed  in  order  to  know:  Feyerabend (1976)  explains  that  any  motivation  for
setting out to discover is a good motivation, and the larger the spectrum, the better for
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science. One thing that can and ought to be done, though, is to be aware of, and to make
explicit, the kind of bias that exists. 
 
2.3. Dürrenmatt's law: technology for technology's sake and ensuing
irrational behaviour
16 Friedrich Dürrenmatt's play The Physicists is  about the law that when knowledge and
technology are available, they will always be used no matter what. The physicist Möbius
has discovered the "Principle of Universal Discovery". Knowing that its spreading will
provoke murder and disease, he hides in a home for the mentally ill. He is spied on by
other "patients", though, who work for leading states, and will be unable to keep his
knowledge secret.  Applied to  a  current  issue,  the  law predicts  for  example  that  the
minute man is able to clone man, clones will exist and proliferate. As much as pre-natal
selection of humans based on everything that can be detected (or that people believe they
can detect: gender, colour of the eyes, size, diseases, homosexuality etc.) is a reality today
no matter what laws or ethics committees say, just because the technology necessary is
available.
17 Everybody knows that raw extractions from Google cannot be used for linguistic inquiry
because of a number of caveats, the most obvious and most invalidating being the fact
that there is no control over the identity of those who produced the material: nobody
knows what they are native speakers of  (or  indeed whether they are humans at  all:
machines  translate  webpages  automatically).  Nonetheless,  Google-based  data  are
constantly used in the literature, typically preceded by the mention that the author is
aware of the caveats.3 Technology will  be put to use just because it exists,  no matter
whether this is reasonable or not. 
18 Everybody (who wants to know) knows that the Shanghai ranking is heavily based on
Nobel Prizes,  and that there are no Nobel Prizes in many disciplines, typically in the
Humanities.4 Nevertheless, the sole existence of the ranking, and its availability upon a
mouse click for people who have no idea about academics but need to distribute money,
make the ranking the absolute reference for officials and decision makers, who engage
large-scale destructions of the academic landscape on the grounds of what they believe
are reliable, objective and measurable facts. France is a case in point: since the presidency
of Chirac, the country is engaged into a long-term programme that seeks to create bigger
universities by forcing existing universities to fuse (the results are called PRES or Idex).
The goal  is  to "be competitive" internationally,  and to mechanically move up in the
Shanghai ranking because more Nobel Prizes and more publications under the same roof
make better Shanghai scores. The content does not matter, thus, it is the same: the only
thing that matters is the Shanghai showcase and its media impact.5 A ranking that exists
will be used, no matter what it measures and what its accuracy.
19 An even more striking (and non-academic) example of Dürrenmatt's law is Klout. Klout is
an Internet-based company that promises to measure the social impact that people have
in this world ("Klout measures your influence based on your ability to drive action on
social networks", Klout webpage, 28 Sept. 2012). A Klout score from 1 to 100 is attributed
to every single individual  on the planet that the company can get hold of,  based on
automatic extraction of information from social networks (mainly Facebook and Twitter:
"[t]he Klout Score incorporates more than 400 signals from seven different networks",
Klout webpage,  28  Sept.  2012).  Customers  such  as  head  hunters  or  human  resource
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managers pay in order to access the Klout score of people they may hire, and they do that
for exactly the same reasons that lead politicians and ministry-technocrats to push the
Shanghai-button:  they are incompetent,  they have no time and they do not  want to
bother doing the evaluation themselves – somebody else has done the work already. The
thing is that unlike the Shanghai authors who explain how their ranking was built, the
Klout  algorithm  is  secret:  nobody  knows  what  exactly  is  counted,  how  factors  are
weighted etc. Given Klout's commercial success, visibly this does not prevent supposedly
rational people from using the opaque Klout score for making decisions. A ranking that
exists will be used, no matter whether it is arbitrary or not.
20 Consider a final example, back to academia: the European Science Foundation has created
a Standing Committee for the Humanities, which builds a European Reference Index for
the Humanities (ERIH). The purpose of this index is to establish a list of relevant journals
for various disciplines, where individual journals are ranked along a three-point scale A,
B, C. The authors of the 2007 edition of the index for linguistics introduce the list with the
explicit mention that "[a]s they stand, the lists are not a bibliometric tool.  The ERIH
Steering Committee and the Expert Panels therefore advise against using the lists as the
only  basis  for  assessment  of  individual  candidates  for  positions  or  promotions  or  of
applicants for research grants." But this is of course exactly what happened: the existence
of  a  ranking or  a  list  will  automatically  lead to  its  application,  no  matter  what  the
content, how they were built, whether they are significant or accurate etc.
21 All this is entirely irrational behaviour in our supposedly rational, academic world where
actors have benefitted from super-high education – but this is how things work, or rather,
how humans work. Relevant for our subject, corpora, is that they have had the status of
cutting-edge high-tech for some time now, and will continue to have it in the foreseeable
future. There is thus reason to be suspicious about the Dürrenmatt-effects associated,
which are inescapable. 
22 This brings us back to the general line of this paper: the corpus is a tool, nothing more,
nothing  less.  Its  sole  existence  is  not  a  scientific  result,  and  the  significance  of  its
contribution to science depends on its design properties, as well as on how it is used.
23 Against this backdrop, the remainder of the article discusses a number of more specific
issues related to corpora.
 
3. More or less direct access to data for different
linguistic disciplines
24 Owing to their intrinsic properties, different linguistic disciplines are more or less far
removed from data sources. Phonology (and probably non-inflectional morphology) need
to construct their object of inquiry much more and much more carefully than syntax (and
inflectional morphology) (Scheer, 2004). This is because phonologists can never be sure
whether  a  given  alternation  is  the  result  of  phonological  computation,  allomorphy,
analogy or distinct lexical recordings. Only in the former case is it a valid window on how
phonology works. 
25 For example, the bare existence of the two words electri[k] and electri[s]ity in English does
not allow us to conclude that there is a phonological computation relating k and s (Halle,
2005,  Green,  2007:175ff).  The  alternation  may  be  due  to  a  grammatical  (but  non-
phonological)  computation,  i.e.  allomorphy,  to  non-  or  para-grammatical  activity
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(analogy), or to no computation at all in case electricity is morphologically non-complex,
i.e. a single lexical recording. 
26 Setting idioms aside, syntax does not have this grievance: every sentence that is uttered
is the result of online syntactic computation.6
 
4. Data are an artefact, not a natural object: they are 
always constructed
27 Data are the result of a human construction, not a thing that is found in nature. As was
shown above, this applies to all scientific inquiry in a broad, kantian sense and is an
essential of current physics. 
28 This being said, it also structures much more narrowly the everyday work of the linguist:
when the PFC corpus (Laks,  2011) is coded for,  say, schwa, there are numerous cases
where the value of a sound cannot be determined, even when the number of transcribers
is multiplied. In case it is decided that a sound is a schwa, whether or not it is coded as
such depends on a number of further decisions, since it may also represent a transitional
sound in word-final position, rather than a vowel that is linguistically relevant. Hence it
is the linguist, not the real world, who decides which real-world item is knighted a piece
of linguistically relevant data, i.e. has the right to impact linguistic reasoning. 
29 The same applies to the electric - electricity example: before anything can be analyzed at
all,  a  decision needs  to  be  made  regarding  the  question whether  or  not  both  items
entertain a derivational  relationship in phonology. This  is  not  anything that  may be
decided by a corpus or real-world properties of the items in question. Only reasoning and
(theoretical) assumptions can show the way. Regarding the specific issue of drawing a red
line  between  the  four  mechanisms  at  hand  (phonological  computation,  allomorphic
computation, analogy, independent lexical recordings), no criterion is in sight that would
allow the linguist to make a firm decision in all cases. In the 70s, phonologists attempted
to define such a criterion, called the evaluation metric (or measure), without success (e.g.
Kiparsky, 1974, Campbell, 1981, Goyvaerts, 1981).
 
5. Limitations: relevant information that the corpus
cannot provide
30 Different data sources have their specific strengths and limitations. There is a large body
of literature on what grammaticality judgements can and cannot do, how they may be
biased, how they should or should not be used etc. (e.g. Botha, 1981, see the discussion in
Durand, 2009). Dangers and limitations of grammaticality judgements and elicitation are
due to the fact that they are partly the result of conscious activity, which produces the
following caveats: 
31 1) impact of normative elements; 
32 2) impact of sociological parameters;
33 3) the fact that a good informant needs to be tutored before he is able to inform.
34 Corpora are in the same situation. Below is a (non exhaustive) list of things that they
cannot, and will never be able to do.
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5.1. Corpora cannot attest the absence of something
35 A defining property of corpora is the fact that they are finite. Hence they can assert the
presence of X, but not its absence in a language: by definition, there is life outside the
corpus that the corpus is blind to. The fact that X does not occur in a corpus, however
multi-billion-item it is, does not mean that X is agrammatical, or irrelevant. 
36 This especially impacts fields of inquiry such as syntax where the number of well-formed
items is infinite, and hence where most of what grammar can generate will never be
attested. Relevant for the study of grammar is what is attestable, not what is actually
attested. Grammaticality judgements fill the gap: they can check the non-attested space.
 
5.2. Corpora can only record performance
37 Corpora can only record performance: they will never be able to provide direct access to
competence. If it is true that what linguists are after is competence, and that performance
is but a shadow on a Platonian cave wall that needs to be interpreted in order for the real
object  to  be  discovered,  corpora  can  only  do  the  first  step  of  inquiry.  By  contrast,
grammaticality judgements open a direct window on competence. 
38 It is well-known, for example, that performance produces a lot of irrelevant noise, i.e.
attested items that must not be used as input data to reasoning (e.g. Sampson, 1978). The
string "that want cat" is not well-formed in English, but may perhaps be attested. All
linguists will immediately discard it from the set of input data to reasoning, and their
decision will be based on prior knowledge, i.e. their intuition as native speakers. In other
words, producing valid and significant input data based on a corpus requires the linguist
in charge to work hand in hand with grammaticality judgements.
 
5.3. Liaison and h-aspiré: corpora cannot detect emphasis
39 A specific example of what corpora cannot do comes from liaison properties of h-aspiré
words (Encrevé & Scheer 2005). The generalization is that h-aspiré words may produce a
glottal stop if preceded by a C-final word, as under Error: Reference source not founda. No
glottal stop is possible after V-final words Error: Reference source not foundb, or with
words that do not have a h-aspiré Error: Reference source not foundc.
40 (1) liaison and h-aspiré
41 a. quelle [ʔ] housse
42 quel [ʔ] hêtre
43 b. une jolie *[ʔ] housse
44 un joli *[ʔ] hêtre
45 c. quelle *[ʔ] armoire
46 quel *[ʔ] homme.
47 However, all asterisked forms do in fact exist and are attested – but this is only when the
nouns have an emphatic meaning as in contrastive focus (indicated by upper case) under
Error: Reference source not found below.
48 (2) quelle [ʔ] ARMOIRE
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49 quel [ʔ] HOMME
50 une jolie [ʔ] HOUSSE
51 un joli [ʔ] HEROS
52 une jolie [ʔ] ARMOIRE
53 un joli [ʔ] HOMME.
54 The simple attestation of items with a glottal stop in a corpus will never produce this
generalization, however large and sophisticated the corpus. This is because the corpus
cannot make a difference between emphatic and non-emphatic meaning. For this we need
a human (and his intuitions) who decides (e.g. by coding a corpus for this property).
 
6. There is no datum vs. exemplum – there is just
good and bad empirical work
55 Bernard Laks has argued for a distinction between two kinds of data, the datum and the
exemplum.  He  holds  that  generative  linguistics,  broadly  speaking,  is  an  ill-inspired
exemplum-interlude  ("armchair  linguistics")  in  serious  scientific  endeavour.  Serious
work in linguistics was always based on datum, and the field has blessedly returned to
this  perspective since the turn of  the 21st century (Laks 2008,  Laks Ms 2011,  Laks &
Calderone Ms 2012).  According to Laks the watershed line is Zellig Harris'  Methods in
Structural Linguistics (Harris 1951): this is when serious datum-linguistics was replaced by
untrustworthy exemplum-armchair-generativism. 
56 Opposing datum and exemplum does not make sense. Conceptually, there is nothing to be
opposed: exemplum is the step in the construction of knowledge that logically follows the
acquisition of the datum, and is based on it. Empirically, there is serious empirical work
after 1951, and non-serious empirical work before 1951.
57 The meaning of the word example is explicit by itself: it does not refer to just a few items
of evidence (as opposed to a large empirical record on the datum side), as Laks implies.
Trivially, examples are exemplary: they surely refer to only a few items of evidence, but
the  author  who  quotes  them  takes  on  the  responsibility  that  these  items  are
representative of  the full  empirical  record.  If  this  promise is  not  brought home,  the
author has done a bad job – but this does not tell us anything about whether or not
quoting examples is a good or a bad thing to do. 
58 Examples exist in order not to drown the audience in a useless and never ending flow of
repetitive data:  a  few representatives  of  each significant  class  or  pattern are shown.
Examples are logically based on a larger pool of data, and they suppose an analysis over
this pool: first patterns need to be identified, then their relevance needs to be established.
The data pool by itself may be amorphous, but examples are not: they are the result of
reasoning, of analysis and of theory. Examples enhance the work of everybody: of the
analyst, who knows where the problems lie and what needs to be accounted for; of the
audience, which is given the same information by means of a few items. All sciences of all
times have always reduced data sets to a few significant examples.
59 Since data are always constructed (see section 4),  building knowledge involves  three
mappings: 
60 1) input: real-world items, output: data; 
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61 2) input: data, output: examples (patterns); 
62 3) input: examples (patterns), output: theory.
63 Hence there is no difference between practice A which is not serious because it bases
theories on a few pieces of data only, and practice B which is serious because it builds on
the full empirical record. There is only a difference between solid and non-solid empirical
work. And, secondarily, there is a difference between work that discusses relevant pieces
of data that have been cautiously chosen and represent whatever is significant, and work
that reviews endless streams of amorphous data. 
64 Needless to say that it is also not the case that no solid empirical work was done by
generative linguists, or after 1951: making such a claim is being unkind to thousands of
linguists who have filled up endless notepads while doing fieldwork, or who have built
extensive databases that try to be exhaustive in a specific area. 
65 Conversely, it is not true either that there was no non-solid empirical work before 1951. A
famous case in point  is  a  1942 paper by Martin Joos (Joos,  1942),  which reports  the
existence of a "dialect B" in Canadian English regarding a phenomenon called Canadian
Raising. Joos' article is three pages long and was published in Language; it is based on a
few words collected, as the author says, in a highschool classroom. Joos' data have made
an important  career,  since  they  were  uncritically  quoted,  taken over  and spread by
generativists: in 1989 they reappear as Bromberger & Halle's (1989) key witness showing
that phonological computation executes instructions in a chronological order (ordered
rules). 
66 The trouble is that there is no evidence independent from Joos' three pages that dialect B
has ever existed: in the 1970s, Canadian dialectologists could not find any trace of it. Kaye
(1990) therefore concludes that either all speakers of this dialect died out naturally before
the age of 40, or that using this particular rule order is lethal. Dialect B is thus a case
where a whole field was taken hostage by 1) a structuralist who did bad empirical work
before 1951, and 2) generativists who gullibly repeated bad data without checking them. 
67 Trubetzkoy's (1939) Grundzüge is another famous case of exemplum-based reasoning, by a
structuralist and before 1951. The author almost exclusively quotes second hand evidence
from languages that he does not know and has never worked on, and he typically does not
quote  a  few,  but  zero words  or  items:  vocalic  systems  are reported  on  the  basis  of
descriptive literature without quoting a single word of the language in question (e.g.
p.111f for the Central Chinese dialect of Siang-tang). Trubetzkoy did the best he could: he
used  the  data  that  were  available  to  him (often  extracted  from the  anthropological
literature), and he used only those that he judged reliable (discussion is often provided
regarding this issue). He may have been, and surely was, wrong on a number of occasions,
when his sources turned out not to be waterproof. This way of browsing a large number
of languages (210 are mentioned in the language index) is often found in generative work
of the past 15 years or so, where several hundreds of languages are browsed, typically in
Ph.Ds (e.g. Kirchner, 1998).
 
7. What is corpus linguistics? 
68 Noam Chomsky has triggered a polemic regarding corpus linguistics: according to him,
there is no such thing.
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"Corpus  linguistics  doesn't  mean  anything.  It's  like  saying  suppose  a  physicist
decides,  suppose  physics  and  chemistry  decide  that  instead  of  relying  on
experiments, what they're going to do is take videotapes of things happening in the
world and they'll collect huge videotapes of everything that's happening and from
that maybe they'll come up with some generalizations or insights. Well, you know,
sciences don't do this.   But maybe they're wrong. Maybe the sciences should just
collect  lots  and  lots  of  data  and  try  to  develop  the  results  from  them.  Well  if
someone wants  to  try that,  fine.  They're  not  going to  get  much support  in the
chemistry or physics or biology department. But if they feel like trying it, well, it's a
free country, try that. We'll judge it by the results that come out. So if results come
from study of massive data, rather like videotaping what's happening outside the
window, fine-look at the results. I don't pay much attention to it. I don't see much
in  the  way  of  results.    My  judgment,  if  you  like,  is  that  we  learn  more  about
language by following the standard method of the sciences. The standard method of
the sciences is not to accumulate huge masses of unanalyzed data and to try to
draw some generalization from them. The modern sciences, at least since Galileo,
have  been  strikingly  different.  What  they  have  sought  to  do  was  to  construct
refined experiments which ask, which try to answer specific questions that arise
within a theoretical context as an approach to understanding the world." Noam
Chomsky in an interview by Andor (2004).
69 Chomsky uses what according to him could be an analogue in physics in order to show
that collecting raw data is worth nothing: would it cross the mind of any physicist to film
how leaves fall down from a tree for days or months if the goal is to understand how and
why they turn while falling? Rather, recording data supposes:
70 1) to know what one is looking for, i.e. to design an experiment;
71 2) to have a working hypothesis;
72 3) to further analyze the data once they are acquired.
73 In Chomsky's mind, corpus linguistics is something where only step one of the production
of knowledge is done (see section 6): real world items are collected, but they are not
established as datum, there is no exemplum, no analysis, no expectation, no experiment
design. Certainly Chomsky's reaction is also due to the term corpus linguistics, which may
be interpreted as the linguistics of corpora. A less ambiguous label would be corpus-based
linguistics, indicating that there is linguistic activity beyond the corpus.
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NOTES
1. See  Collini (2012)  on  the  idea  that  science,  and  especially  the  humanities,  need  to  be
immediately useful to society.
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2. Note  that  serendipity,  which  has  produced  a  number  of  scientific  discoveries,  does  not
undermine this point. Louis Pasteur put it this way: "luck favours the prepared mind" ("Dans les
champs de l'observation, le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés").
3. Cases in point are Hathout et al. (2008) and Hathout et al. (2009); Hundt et al. (2007) provides an
overview of the landscape. Of course, identifying material on Google and then testing it with
native speakers is a perfectly regular strategy of investigation, and there is no objection. It is
only when statistics are directly made on Google data that there is no way to control for the
caveats. A standard response is that caveat-created noise will lean out statistically and may be
detected by this  means.  Or  that  the volume of  this  noise  is  so small  that  it  won't  have any
significant impact on the result. I have never seen a case where these assertions are checked
against the data, the reason being that 1) separating noise from non-noise statistically is not an
easy thing to do and 2) even if this were done, the result could not be compared to the real
amount of noise, which is unknown and cannot be calculated.
4. Except for economics and literature, but the latter is for people who produce literature, not for
academics who write about it.
5. Exactly  the  same  logic  is  applied  in  higher  education:  French  government  wants  higher
"success rates" (ratio between students inscribed and students who are granted a degree), and
State funding of Universities is partly correlated to this "indicator of success" (benchmarking
imported from capitalism). Universities are thus under pressure (an economic "incentive") to
distribute more degrees. This can be achieved either by trying to provide better instruction and
thereby modifying the content  of  the students'  minds,  or  simply by lowering the standards:
students  need a  degree,  they  pay  for  it,  so  give  it  to them no matter  what  their  skills  and
competences. Guess which way Universities go… 
6. Though it is of course true that there are also lexically stored sentences, and that their number
is subject to debate. See e.g. Bybee (2005) on this issue.
RÉSUMÉS
Le corpus a toujours été, est et sera un outil précieux qui aide à poursuivre un but. Son statut
ontologique  d'outil  ne  changera  pas,  aussi  fabuleux  soient  la  puissance  computationnelle,  la
capacité de stockage, la rapidité d'accès et de transmission, et quelle que soit sa taille. Le corpus
est une source de données parmi d'autres (dont, notamment, les jugements de grammaticalité)
qui a des avantages et limitations spécifiques dont l'usager doit être conscient – au même titre
que pour n'importe quel autre outil.
Noyé dans l'utilitarisme et l'hystérie autour des projets qui de nos jours dominent l'academia,
beaucoup  croient,  ouvertement  ou  tacitement  (ou  encore  à  leur  insu),  que  la  recherche  qui
implique la construction d'un corpus assortie d'une exploitation computationnelle "puissante"
est plus sérieuse que celle qui n'en implique pas. D'aucuns même pensent que la finalité d'un
projet de recherche peut se réduire à la création d'un corpus, que le corpus produira la science
par ses vertus intrinsèques, et qu'il peut donc se substituer au raisonnement et à la dialectique
entre données et hypothèse. La même idéologie promeut l'idée qu'aucun énoncé ne peut être
scientifique sans être statistiquement significatif. C'est ici que le corpus cesse d'être un outil, i.e.
où le système bascule dans la folie. Depuis une décennie ou davantage, c'est ce qui s'est passé :
sans avoir rien demandé, le pauvre corpus se retrouve au milieu d'un blizzard et se fait abuser
par l'idéologie dominante.
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The corpus was, is and will be a valuable tool that helps pursuing a goal. Its ontological status as a
tool will not change, no matter how fabulous the computational power, storage capacity, access
and transmission speed, and whatever the size of the corpus. The corpus is a data source among
others (namely grammaticality judgements), which has specific advantages and limitations that
the user needs to be aware of – like for any other tool.
Drowned in the ambient  utilitarianism and project-hysteria,  many people  believe,  overtly  or
tacitly (or without being aware that they do),  that research which involves the building of a
corpus coupled with exploitation by a "powerful" computer programme, is more serious than a
competitor which does not. Some even believe that the whole purpose of a research project may
be the creation of a corpus, and that the corpus will produce science by itself, i.e. substitute itself
to  reasoning  and  the  data-expectation  dialectic.  The  same  ideology  promotes  the  idea  that
whatever scientific statement is made, it  needs to be statistically relevant.  This is  where the
corpus stops being a tool, i.e. where the system goes mad. And it did on a large scale in the past
decade or so. Poor corpora are in the middle of this thunderstorm, and are abundantly abused by
the ideology in place.
INDEX
Mots-clés : corpus, outil, hystérie autour des projets, financement de la recherche, politique de
recherche irrationnelle, loi de Dürrenmatt
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